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The Potential Effect of Offering Lump Sums in the Social Security
Program
Summary
New research reframes the debate about Social Security solvency and moves away from questions of who
should bear the greater burden of fixing the system by offering a lump sum payment model as a way to
encourage people to delay claiming their Social Security benefits. Under one of the lump sum alternatives
presented in this brief, survey participants indicated a willingness to delay claiming Social Security by up to
eight months, on average, compared to the status quo, and to continue working for four of them. Delayed
claiming would mean additional months or years of Social Security payroll tax contributions, which could
modestly improve the program’s solvency.
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The Potential Effect of Offering 
Lump Sums in the Social Security 
Program1
Raimond Maurer, PhD; Olivia S. Mitchell, PhD;  
Ralph Rogalla, PhD; and Tatjana Schimetschek, MSc
Headlines about H.R.1314, the 2015 “Bipartisan Budget Act,” focused mainly 
on the deal’s success in avoiding another collision with the debt ceiling, along 
with the fact that the compromise included federal spending increases for the 
first time in several years.
Another key component, however, was a change to the 
Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance program 
(OASDI)—the official name for Social Security in the 
United States—and this merits a closer look. 
When Social Security revenue is collected through 
payroll taxes, the vast majority of these taxes flow to 
either the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) 
Trust Fund or the Federal Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
Trust Fund. Collectively, these Trust Funds have enough 
reserves to remain solvent until 2034.2 But as noted 
recently in Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative’s 
September 2015 Issue Brief, “Social Security’s Trustees 
have indicated that [the SSDI Trust Fund] will be fully 
depleted by late 2016 unless the U.S. Congress enacts 
changes before then.”3 While no change in H.R. 1314 
alters the combined OASI-SSDI reserve projection 
of 2034, the Act does delay SSDI Trust Fund reserve 
depletion until 2022.4 This is to be accomplished via 
the reallocation of payroll taxes in calendar years 2016 
through 2018, when a greater portion of the OASDI 
payroll tax, financed equally by employees and employ-
ers, will be directed to the SSDI Trust Fund.5 
The postponement of SSDI reserve depletion means 
that cuts in monthly benefits to disabled workers and 
SUMMARY
• Political debate has focused on the question of whether Social 
Security solvency should be achieved by larger benefit cuts or 
higher taxes, which in effect asks which people—current or 
future generations—should bear the greater burden of fixing 
the system.
• But new research reframes this debate, offering a budget-
neutral, actuarially fair lump sum payment, instead of the current 
delayed retirement credit, as a way to encourage people to 
delay claiming their Social Security benefits and work longer.
• Under one of the lump sum alternatives presented here, survey 
participants indicated a willingness to delay claiming Social 
Security by up to eight months, on average, compared to the 
status quo, and to continue working for four of them.
• Delayed claiming would mean additional months or years of 
Social Security payroll tax contributions, which could modestly 
improve the program’s solvency.  Other benefits are possible as 
well: improved physical and mental health among the elderly 
from extended labor force participation, which could reduce the 
strain on health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid and 
help offset the macroeconomic costs of an aging population. 
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their families will not materialize 
in the weeks leading up to the 2016 
Presidential election. Given that, it 
seems unlikely that Congress will 
do much more in the short run to 
resolve longer-term Social Security 
solvency. Nevertheless, a few Presi-
dential candidates, specifically Sena-
tor Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and New 
Jersey Governor Chris Christie, have 
made Social Security solvency con-
cerns a central part of their respective 
platforms and could influence new 
legislation to address future Trust 
Fund shortfalls. To date, however, 
it appears that their proposed solu-
tions may improve solvency only very 
slightly, if at all.
Recent analysis from the Urban 
Institute looked at several reform 
options in terms of their impact on 
Social Security solvency.6 For exam-
ple, it showed that raising the OASI 
full retirement age (FRA), currently 
age 67, would extend Trust Fund 
reserves by only one year. Similarly, 
a modest increase in the early retire-
ment age, currently age 62, would 
have virtually no impact on solvency. 
Boosting the payroll tax rate could 
help, but this is politically unappealing 
to many. And finally, eliminating the 
current wage cap of $118,500 (as sug-
gested by Sanders) would require the 
roughly 7% of earners who earn more 
than the cap to send 12.4% more 
of their pay into OASDI each year. 
Nevertheless, even this action only 
adds 21 additional years of solvency to 
the Trust Fund. In other words, even 
the last, fairly costly, proposal is not an 
enduring solution.
Almost inevitably, then, political 
debate has turned to a discussion over 
whether solvency should be achieved 
by larger benefit cuts or higher taxes, 
which in effect asks which people—
current or future generations—should 
bear the greater burden of fixing the 
system. Yet new research7 by Olivia S. 
Mitchell of the University of Penn-
sylvania, her colleagues Raimond 
Maurer and Tatjana Schimetschek 
of Goethe University Frankfurt, and 
Ralph Rogalla of St. John’s University 
(the research team hereafter referred 
to as MMRS), reframes the Social 
Security debate in a different light. As 
this Issue Brief describes, they offer a 
budget-neutral, actuarially fair lump 
sum payment—instead of the current 
delayed retirement credit—as a way 
to encourage people to delay claiming 
their OASI benefits and work longer.
As life expectancies continue to 
rise and OASDI Trust Funds hurtle 
toward insolvency, attempts to pro-
long working years and incentivize 
delayed benefits claiming become very 
important in sustaining Social Secu-
rity. Accordingly, the results of this 
alternative approach will be useful for 
policymakers, namely in (1) measuring 
who would delay claiming benefits if 
offered a lump sum instead of higher 
annuity payments, (2) examining how 
long they would wait, and (3) how 
much longer, if at all, they would con-
tinue working in the interim.
THE MOST IMPORTANT 
FINANCIAL DECISION MANY 
HOUSEHOLDS WILL EVER 
MAKE
Currently, the U.S. Social Security 
status quo rules allow eligible workers 
to claim retirement benefits as early 
as age 62 and as late as age 70. It is 
not until age 67, the aforementioned 
FRA, that first-time benefits claim-
ants would receive monthly benefits 
equal to 100 percent of their primary 
insurance amounts, or PIAs.8 Table 1 
shows the boost in monthly benefits 
for each year of benefit deferral, such 
as the 43 percent increase in benefits 
to workers who delay claiming OASI 
until their FRA (from age 62 to 67). 
Despite these substantial monthly 
increases, a large share of U.S. workers 
claims benefits and ceases working 
 1  This research draws on the authors’ research. See Rai-
mond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, Ralph Rogalla, and Tatjana 
Schimetschek, “Will They Take the Money and Work? An 
Empirical Analysis of People’s Willingness to Delay Claiming 
Social Security Benefits for a Lump Sum.” NBER Working 
Paper 20614, 2014. Below we refer to this study as MMRS.
 2  This exhaustion date is taken from the 2015 Annual Report 
of the Board of Trustees of the OASI and DI Trust Funds, July 
22, 2015. We note that Trust Funds assets consist mainly 
of IOU’s owed by the US Treasury to Social Security; see 
John Cogan and Olivia S. Mitchell, “Perspectives from the 
President’s Commission on Social Security Reform,” Journal 
of Economic Literature 17(2): 149-172. 
 3  Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative, “SSDI Reform: Pro-
moting Return to Work without Compromising Economic 
Security,” September 2015.
 4  Letter from the Social Security Administration to Speaker 
John Boehner, October 27, 2015. Note: these estimates are 
preliminary and subject to change.
 5  Of the 12.40% OASDI payroll tax, the SSDI Trust Fund will 
receive 2.37% from 2016-2018, up from 1.80%.
 6  Karen E. Smith, “Can Social Security Be Solvent?” Urban 
Institute, October 2015.
 7  See MMRS, cited above.
 8  The SSA determines workers’ PIAs based on their personal 
earnings histories; for the agency’s benefit calculators see 
http://1.usa.gov/1RyfynL.
 9  Meanwhile, OASI payments make up only about 17% of 
aggregate income for Americans age 65+ in the highest 
income quintile, as funds from pensions, personal financial 
NOTES
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as young as possible. According to 
the SSA, Social Security accounts for 
the lion’s share of aggregate income, 
roughly 84%, for Americans older 
than age 65 in the lowest income 
quintile.9 Therefore, given the sheer 
dependence that many U.S. house-
holds have on Social Security, the 
choice of when to elect benefits is 
likely the most important financial 
decision they will ever make over  
their lifetimes. 
In related work, Mitchell has also 
shown that many Americans lack a 
good command of even basic aspects 
of financial literacy, much less annui-
tized payments like Social Security or 
how to value them.10 
For this reason, the MMRS team 
designed a test to determine the 
perceived value of an actuarially fair 
lump sum option for delaying Social 
Security benefit claiming, and whether 
offering people this could induce them 
to delay claiming and work longer. 
Developing a survey of U.S. residents 
within the framework of the RAND 
American Life Panel (ALP), they 
assessed people’s responsiveness to 
the idea of suddenly having access to 
the present value of benefit increases 
earned by working longer in the form 
of a lump sum. They first calculated 
and presented to each respondent 
their unique monthly OASI benefit 
from age 62 through age 70 under 
the status quo system rules, based on 
answers from questions about their 
own work histories. Then, after asking 
respondents their planned claiming 
ages, the researchers offered two  
alternative scenarios to their 2,451 
survey participants. 
In the first experimental scenario 
(i.e., Lump Sum, or LS), a worker was 
offered her age 62 monthly benefit 
plus a lump sum that would grow 
the longer she waited to claim Social 
Security. This lump sum was actuari-
ally fair, meaning that it was equal to 
the present value of all future benefit 
increases under the status quo, pay-
able on the date of her claiming. In 
the second experimental scenario 
(i.e., Delayed Lump Sum, or DLS), 
if a worker waited until her FRA 
to claim Social Security, she would 
receive her higher monthly payment 
(just as under the status quo), but if 
she delayed claiming even longer, she 
would receive her higher FRA benefit 
(as of age 67) plus a lump sum, similar 
to the LS scenario. These scenarios 
accordingly cost taxpayers no more or 
less money than the current system, 
since the lump sums and benefits were 
assets, and other earnings streams act to diversify retire-
ment income sources. Source: Social Security Administra-
tion, Income of the Aged Chartbook, 2012. US SSA: April 
2014. 
10 See Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia S. Mitchell. “Financial 
Literacy and Economic Outcomes: Evidence and Policy 
Implications. Journal of Retirement Economics. 2015. 3(1): 
107-114; and Jeffrey R. Brown, Arie Kapteyn, and Olivia S. 
Mitchell. “Framing and Claiming: How Information Framing 
Affects Expected Social Security Claiming Behavior.” Journal 
of Risk and Insurance. 2013.  
 11  Wealth also plays a role in the labor force participation deci-
sion: those with the most wealth are the least likely to extend 
their working lives, since they can choose to self-finance 
their retirements before collecting their lump sums.
 12  Susann Rohwedder and Robert J. Willis, 2010, “Mental Re-
tirement,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(1), 119-38.
 13  Gabriel Sahlgren. “Work Longer, Live Healthier – The Rela-
tionship between Economic Activity, Health, and Government 
Policy,” IEA Discussion Paper No. 46, 2013.
NOTES
TABLE 1: DELAYED CLAIMING BOOSTS MONTHLY SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS: 
STATUS QUO
Claiming Monthly Boost with 1 Cumulative boost 
Age Benefit: (% of PIA) year delay (%) compared to age 62 (%)
62 70   
63 75 7.14 7.14 
64 80 6.67 14.29 
65 86.67 8.34 23.81 
66 93.33 7.70 33.33 
67 100 7.15 42.86 
68 108 8 54.29 
69 116 7.41 65.71 
70 124 6.90 77.14
Notes: Full Retirement Age (FRA): 67; PIA = Primary Insurance Amount. Source: www.ssa.gov.
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set as actuarially neutral. 
The order in which respondents 
saw each of the two scenarios was 
randomized, so that researchers could 
compare how claiming ages would 
change vis-à-vis the status quo, and to 
control for framing effects across sur-
vey participants. Finally, the research-
ers asked respondents to state how 
much additional work each would 
engage in, depending on the scenario, 
in order to determine whether any 
delayed claiming would be associated 
with an increase in work, along with 
the longer wait to claim benefits. 
SURVEY FINDINGS
The researchers find that a large 
group of respondents would prefer 
to work longer and delay claiming 
Social Security if they can receive an 
actuarially fair lump sum instead of 
higher annuity payments. Compared 
to the status quo, people would delay 
claiming under the LS scenario by an 
additional five months on average, and 
of those five months, they would con-
tinue working for two of them. Under 
the DLS scenario, people would delay 
claiming by about eight months more 
on average, and of those eight months 
they would continue working for four 
of them. 
As noted above, the presentation 
of each scenario was randomized, 
and the authors found that framing 
did play a significant role in shaping 
respondents’ claiming patterns. For 
those who first saw the LS scenario 
which offered a substantial lump 
sum relatively early (i.e., on aver-
age $73,000 for claiming at age 66), 
respondents delayed their claiming 
by very little. For those shown the 
DLS scenario first, survey partici-
pants anchored on a higher claiming 
age and lower lump sum, since the 
lump sum would be payable only after 
reaching FRA. Accordingly, those who 
saw the LS scenario second delayed 
their claiming by more, although not 
as long as in the DLS scenario.
Figure 1 depicts the results of the 
delayed claiming decision due to the 
lump sum incentives, while Figure 
2 shows how much additional labor 
force participation would result. In 
both cases, the box plots denote the 
25th and 75th percentiles, while 
the line inside each box reflects the 
median survey response (the dot 
represents the mean response). All 
numbers are in months post age 62. 
For example, under the DLS scenario, 
Figure 1 shows that respondents 
would claim at 53.3 months after age 
62 on average, or about eight months 
later than their stated claiming ages 
under the status quo (45 months, on 
average). Additionally, Figure 2 shows 
FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF CLAIMING AGES: STATUS QUO VS. TWO  
LUMP SUM ALTERNATIVES
FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL WORK EFFORT: STATUS QUO VS. TWO  
LUMP SUM ALTERNATIVES
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that these respondents would spend 
38.7 percent of their time in addi-
tional fulltime work post-age 62,  
or 4 months more than under the 
status quo. 
The researchers then conducted 
multivariate regression analysis to 
evaluate how people with specific 
characteristics (e.g., sex, age, mari-
tal status, education level, economic 
status, and other preferences) might 
change their behavior under the two 
alternative scenarios, holding other 
factors constant. Ultimately, only a 
few variables significantly differenti-
ated those who were responsive to the 
lump sum offer, from those who were 
not. In addition to the order in which 
respondents saw the scenarios, other 
significant factors included financial 
literacy, political trust in the OASDI 
program, and a high level of indebted-
ness. All were associated with a larger 
claiming delay (presumably in order 
to obtain a larger lump sum). But per-
haps the most interesting result of all 
is that the respondents who were most 
responsive to the lump sum alterna-
tives were those who would have 
claimed earliest under the status quo. 
In other words, these were the same 
people who stand to benefit the most 
from higher monthly payments under 
the current regime.
LESSONS FOR 
POLICYMAKERS
Policymakers seeking to bolster the 
solvency of Social Security without 
raising taxes or cutting retirement 
benefits may find new reform ideas 
in these findings, as well as the fact 
that people’s delayed claiming pat-
terns do not differ by wealth levels, 
the presence of other annuities, OASI 
benefit amounts, planning horizons, or 
expected investment.11
The benefits of delayed claiming 
include the obvious result of addi-
tional months or years of individual 
contributions to Social Security 
through payroll taxes, which could 
modestly improve the program’s sol-
vency. Continued labor force partici-
pation could also result in improved 
physical and mental health among the 
elderly.12 In turn, this latter benefit 
may enhance the financial status of 
healthcare systems such as Medicare 
and Medicaid. It could also help offset 
the macroeconomic costs of an aging 
population, if quality of life for indi-
vidual workers does in fact improve 
on account of longer working lives.13 
Lastly, though the survey designed by 
the researchers in this instance was 
created to be budget-neutral to avoid 
any wealth transfers between genera-
tions, it remains to be seen whether 
people might also be willing to delay 
claiming and work longer for lump 
sums that are less than actuarially 
fair, which would enhance the Social 
Security program’s sustainability.
CONCLUSION
Policymakers who are serious about 
reforming Social Security to improve 
solvency would do well to explore 
lump sums as an alternative to the 
status quo of higher annuity payments 
as a reward for delayed claiming. The 
usual reform options which fuel cur-
rent debates about winners and losers 
in the realm of Social Security have 
not advanced the dialogue, much less 
action, regarding how to make the 
system solvent for current and future 
generations. The clock ticks, and the 
U.S. needs new thinking based on 
solid evidence.
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
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